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ABSTRACT 
The issue revolving around corporate governance has always been an essential and critical 
element for both private and public sectors particularly in Kuwait. Kuwait‟s Prime Minister 
has even stressed for more concentration on the issues of governance for the purpose of 
overseeing the effective running of the public and private sector through a check and balance 
system. Moreover, the Prime Minister argued the need of the firms in the country to 
benchmark to an effective system that emphasizes on positive issues such as ethics, openness, 
accountability, transparency, and integrity in the public and private sector. Therefore, this 
crucial issue has to be addressed accordingly in order to enhance the performance of firms.  
It has been generally believed that good corporate governance is a critical factor in the 
improvement of firm value in both developing and developed financial markets. However, 
this belief overlooked the fact that the relationship between corporate governance and the 
value of a firm varies in developing and developed financial markets owing to the character 
of the corporate governance structures existing in the markets based on dissimilar social, 
economic and regulatory conditions. This reality calls for the need to examine and 
comprehend the differences affecting the firm value for the purpose of academic, financial 
and management practices and public regulation of markets and corporations. 
The core aim of the present study is the examination of the relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance of non-financial, listed Kuwaiti firms on the Kuwaiti 
stock exchange. For the purpose of the study, data was collected from a sample of 136 
companies for the financial year of 2009. Among corporate governance‟s various variables, 
five were chosen to be included in the study namely CEO duality, COE tenure, audit 
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committee size, board size and board composition and one measures namely return on assets 
(ROA) was chosen as measures of firm performance. 
Furthermore, regression analysis was utilized for the examination of the relationship between 
board characteristics and firm performance. The result indicates that the relationship between 
CEO duality and ROA is positive in the significant level. Therefore, this result found that the 
relationship between CEO tenure and ROA is negative in the significant level. By contrast, 
this result found that the relationship between audit committee size with ROA is positive with 
significant level. In addition to that, this result found that the relationship between board size 
and board composition is negative but not significant. Furthermore, this study using firm size 
and leverage as a control variables found that the relationship between firm size and ROA is 
positively insignificant. Finally, the outcome of the relationship between leverage and ROA 
is negatively significant. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Study 
Businesses around the world require development and growth in order to attract funding from 
investors. Before they invest in a particular business, investors normally make sure that the 
business in question is financially secure and stable and possesses the ability to produce 
profits in the long run (Mallin, 2007). Hence, in instances where the company position is not 
as promising, it will not be as attractive to investors as it hopes to be. This failure to attract 
enough capital normally leads to negative consequences for the business in particular and for 
the economy in general.  
Based on the agency theory, the agency relationship is a contract whereby one or more 
persons (principal) engage another person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf, 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Nevertheless, the theory also holds the notion of the inappropriateness of management 
or the agent in taking the best possible action for the public and for the shareholders‟ sake as 
the agents generally acts for their own interests. Therefore, for the achievement of a balanced 
alignment between the principal‟s and agent‟s interests, and to remain within the agency 
budget, different internal as well as external corporate governance mechanisms have been 
expounded on (Haniffa & Huduib, 2006).   
Governments all over the globe, takes recourse in corporate governance for the safety and 
security of the business environment. According to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), it has been stated that “good corporate governance is 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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